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Abstract This paper provides an overview of the emerging "Superfund" nat-
ural resource damage assessment and compensation framework and a review
of several economic and legal issues that are likely to affect the ability of the
framework to achieve its objectives. The Superfund Act as amended estab-
lishes a federal regulatory structure that provides a legal "legitimization" for
the use of economic-based nonmarket valuation techniques in judicial pro-
ceedings involving natural resource injuries resulting from oil and hazardous
waste spills and releases. While the regulations have the potential to foster
more appropriate compensation as well as prospective incentives to limit dam-
ages to natural resources, several controversial elements, definitions, and as-
sumptions built into the damage assessment regulations appear to have the
potential to undermine the efficiency and equity of damage assessments. These
issues reflect the difficulty of integrating economic concepts of natural re-
source value and their estimation into the legal environment.
Introduction
Until quite recently, the most visible application of economic techniques for nat-
ural resource valuation was in the context of helping to guide policy decisions.
For example, economic tools for measuring natural resource values have long
been used (with varying degrees of accuracy and efficacy) to evaluate the social
costs and benefits of federal water resources development proposals. In recent
years economic tools also have been increasingly applied to determine the benefits
of specific federal regulatory options. The passage of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Recovery Act in 1980 (CERCLA) placed
the spotlight on compensation for injuries to natural resources as another appli-
cation of these tools. While there is a history under federal and state statutory
and common law of using economic analysis to value natural resource injuries
(especially from oil spills), CERCLA formalized this process by establishing a
federal regulatory structure that may eventually set the rules for how economic
analysis will be factored into a wide range of judicial proceedings involving oil
and hazardous waste spills and releases.
The federal regulations that will implement the emerging CERCLA natural
resource compensation framework were promulgated on August 1, 1986. The
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content and requirements of these regulations may have important implications
for both the allocation of social resources and for the field of natural resource
economics. The historical legal approach to compensation for injury to public
natural resources has relied typically on diminution in market price, or, in cases
involving nonmarket resources, on restoration or replacement cost as a basis for
measuring natural resource damages. Because these measures often do not ad-
equately reflect real economic loss resulting from injury to public resources, their
use for determining damages has limited the effectiveness of the common law
judicial system in achieving the desired allocation of public resources.
The new federal regulatory framework provides a legal "legitimization" for
the use of economic-based nonmarket valuation in the courts. The new rules have
introduced the newer, and more theoretically appropriate and accurate, nonmar-
ket valuation methods based on willingness-to-pay as the basis for damage as-
sessment. The regulatory framework thus provides an important new application
for nonmarket valuation methods in the public policy context. Moreover, the
regulations have the potential to set a substantial precedent for the use of economic
concepts and valuation methodologies in court cases involving injury to public
resources, whether or not the federal rules are invoked.
Increased reliance on economic-based valuation methods for estimating nat-
ural resource damages could result in more appropriate compensation as well as
prospective incentives to limit damage to natural resources. Yet, the interaction
between the theory of natural resource valuation and the practical constraints of
an adversarial judicial system is bound to affect the ability of the compensation
scheme to achieve appropriate damage awards. The federal rulemaking has at-
tempted to integrate economic valuation methods into a generally conservative
legal system that has developed over a long period of time. It represents a some-
what uneasy compromise between being fair to economics and full compensa-
tion while not opening the door to a complete revamping of the common law.
The resulting thin line drawn by the rules does expand some traditional notions
of natural resource damages, while at the same time limits its broader applica-
tion.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the federal natural
resource damage assessment and compensation framework and to highlight sev-
eral economic and legal issues that are likely to affect the ability of the framework
to achieve its objectives. By briefly reviewing CERCLA and its natural resource
damage provisions as a whole, and by outlining the assessment regulations and
identifying certain potential concerns, we hope to help provide a better under-
standing of the compensation process and foster a broad evaluation of the emerg-
ing framework. One important caveat concerning many points raised in this paper
is particularly worth noting. The Type B damage assessment regulations, which
lay out the general assessment process and the specific procedures for assessing
damages in individual cases, have been challenged by several environmental
groups, and state resource trustees in administrative appeals filed in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.' Even if the regulations remain
unchanged as a result of these challenges, various provisions of the CERCLA
natural resource damage assessment framework may be subject to judicial review
as individual cases are brought under the statute. Court decisions on various
aspects of the framework could change their meaning and interpretation.Compensation for Natural Resource Injury 157
The Legal Structure
Statutory Framework
1. Overview of the Act. In response to public concern over releases of hazardous
substances into the environment. Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act^ in 1980 to deal with the threats
posed by abandoned hazardous wastes sites and releases of hazardous substances
in general. The provisions of CERCLA were extended and strengthened by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) passed on October 17,
1986.^ The Act as amended provides Federal and state governments with broad
authorities to respond to releases of hazardous substances into the environment.
CERCLA also provides a liability and compensation mechanism for recovery of
governmental response costs from the parties responsible for hazardous substance
releases. To ensure that money would be available to complete the job of cleaning
up abandoned hazardous waste sites, CERCLA established a $1.6 billion Haz-
ardous Substance Response Eund financed primarily be excise taxes levied on
crude oil and certain chemicals. (Under SARA, the name of the fund was changed
to the "Hazardous Substance Superfund," and its size was expanded to $8.5
billion.)
The basic liability and compensation provisions for response costs are set out
in Section 107 of the Act. Liability is imposed on current and former owners and
operators of polluting vessels or facilities, as well as those engaged in the gen-
eration, treatment, and disposal of hazardous substances'* for damages resulting
from releases'' into the environment. The courts have interpreted these provisions
as imposing strict, joint and several liability on these parties for hazardous sub-
stance releases.^ Essentially, this liability scheme can be used to force a "re-
sponsible party" to bear the full cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste release
no matter how tenuous their connection to the release (or how many other parties
contributed to the release) or how carefully they handled the offending wastes.
The Hazardous Substance Superfund'' was established to finance clean-ups in
cases where the polluting parties are unknown or are unwilling or unable to provide
recompense. The types of claims permissable against the Superfund include claims
for payment of governmental response costs incurred under the Act's response
authority provisions and other necessary response costs under the National Con-
tingency Plan.** Payment of claims by the Superfund transfers to the Fund the
right of the claimant to sue the polluting parties.
An important but often overlooked component of CERCLA is the Act's natural'
resource damage provisions.^ While the problem of cleaning up abandoned haz-
ardous wastes sites has garnered considerable publicity and a vast amount of
litigation involving liability for response costs have occupied the courts, the po-
tential significance of the natural resource damage provisions has generally es-
caped attention. However, these provisions have been called the Superfund
"sleeper" and have the potential to greatly increase the amount of damages pol-
luting parties may be held liable for under CERCLA.
2. Natural Resource Damage Provisions. The natural resource damage provi-
sions authorize federal and state governments to recover compensatory damages
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discharges of oil or releases of hazardous substances pursuant to CERCLA and
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376). These provisions
reflect Congressional recognition that hazardous substance contamination of the
environment may impose social costs which would not be fully redressed by the
clean-up of waste sites and private causes of action brought under state common
law. The CERCLA legislative history suggests Congress' intent to allow for com-
pensatory natural resource damages following existing common law doctrines.
Together, the response cost and natural resource damage compensation provi-
sions of CERCLA form a mechanism to force responsible parties to provide re-
dress for a significant portion of the social costs of their polluting activities.
Compensable natural resource damages are defined under Section 107 of CER-
CLA as damages for "injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, in-
cluding the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting
from such a release.'"" The Act specifies that in the case of such natural resource
injury "liability shall be to the U.S. government and to any State for natural
resources within the State or belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or ap-
pertaining to such State" and that "the President, or authorized representative
of any State, shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of such natural resources,
to recover for such damages."" Natural resources are defined very broadly to
include land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water sup-
plies, and other such resources. '^ The Act thus enables Eederal agencies and state
government trustees, who act as custodians for the public through protection and
care of a wide range of public resources, to recover damages for injury to such
resources caused by releases of oil or hazardous substances. CERCLA further
specifies that "sums recoverable shall be available for use to restore, rehabilitate,
or acquire the equivalent of such resources by the appropriate agencies of the
Federal government or the state government, but the measure of such damages
shall not be limited by the sums which can be used to restore or replace such
resources.'"-^
The Act contains certain restrictions on compensation for natural resource
injury. No claim can be made for the recovery of natural resource damages unless
the claim is presented within three years after the discovery of the loss and its
connection with the release or the date of final promulgation of the natural resouce
regulations, whichever is later. ''* The Act further limits the liabilities of responsible
parties for natural resource damages to $50 million.''*
Under CERCLA, natural resource trustees were originally authorized to make
claims against the Superfund for natural resource damages in cases involving
resource injury caused by hazardous substances. However, a new provision added
by SARA prohibits claims against the Superfund for natural resource damages."*
Trustees seeking natural resource damages thus must sue potentially responsible
parties directly.
To assist trustees in bringing natural resource damage actions. Section 301(c)
of CERCLA required the President to promulgate regulations for use in guiding
the assessment of natural resource damages. These regulations are to include two
different types of standardized procedures for assessing natural resource injury
and placing a dollar amount on this injury: Type A or simplified assessment tech-
niques for smaller releases; and Type B protocols that will include more detailed
and extensive assessment methodologies for more major releases. Type A pro-
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requiring minimal field observation, including establishing measures of damages
based on units of discharge or release units or units of affected area." Type B
procedures are specified by the Act to include "alternative protocols for con-
ducting assessments in individual cases to determine the type and extent of short-
and long-term injury, destruction, or loss." The Act specifies that these regula-
tions "shall identify the best available procedures to determine such damages,
including both direct and indirect injury, destruction or loss and shall take into
consideration factors including, but not limited to, replacement value, use value,
and ability of the ecosystem or resource to recover."'^ CERCLA also provides
that damage assessments developed using these regulations will create a rebuttable
presumption of accuracy.
Natural resource trustees are not required to follow the assessment regulations
in determining natural resource damages claims; however, a determination of
damages conducted by any federal or state trustee in accordance with the as-
sessment regulations "shall have the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption"
on behalf of the trustee in any administrative or adjudicatory proceeding under
CERCLA or Section 311 of the Clean Water Act."* CERCLA's rebuttable pre-
sumption for natural resource damage claims provides leverage to trustees in
proving damage claims if the regulations are followed, but exactly how and to
what extent is unclear.
There is currently much confusion over how the rebuttable presumption will
work in natural resource damage cases, as well as a significant debate within the
legal profession concerning the exact force and effect of the tool in the CERCLA
context. The Act itself and its legislative history are silent on these issues. It is
helpful here to provide a basic definition for a legal presumption and to highlight
its potential complexity in the CERCLA natural resource damage context, and
to briefly outline the major issue in the legal debate.
A presumption is an evidentiary procedure that allows one to infer the exis-
tence of a presumed fact from a basic fact that has been established. Typically,
a presumption applies to a single, reasonably well-defined basic fact and deter-
mines a single, reasonably well-defined presumed fact. Eor example, a common
presumption used in drunk driving cases takes as the basic fact the level of alcohol
in a driver's blood and derives the presumed fact that the driver is intoxicated.
The situation under CERCLA is much more complicated, however. A trustee's
determination of natural resource damages most likely will be the sum of many
lesser, discrete damage determinations. A question arises as to whether the pre-
sumption in the CERCLA context applies to each of these lesser damage deter-
minations that might be made in a particular case, or only to the total or final
damage assessment. In this type of case, some of the basic facts used to infer the
final presumption may actually be presumptions from previous determinations.
The crux of the legal debate surrounding the force and effect of the rebuttable
presumption in the CERCLA natural resource damages context deals with
whether the presumption shifts to defendants only the burden of going forward
with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, or both the burden of proof as
well as the burden of going forward with evidence. The latter interpretation would
give much more weight to trustee damage determinations. This issue likely will
not be resolved until it is the subject of review by the courts in the context of a
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come will interpret the CERCLA rebuttable presumption heavily in favor of
trustees.'^
In summary, the CERCLA natural resource damage provisions create a po-
tentially powerful new mechanism for the recovery of public damages resulting
from natural resource injury caused by discharges of oil or releases of hazardous
substances. By providing for damages from injury to a broad range of natural
resources caused by many types of contaminants, and by requiring the devel-
opment of a set of regulations to guide damage assessments bolstered by a re-
buttable presumption of accuracy, the CERCLA natural resource damage pro-
visions go beyond the scope of previous common law doctrines and statutes.^°
Regulatory Famework
1. Implementation. The President, in Executive Order No. 12316, delegated to
the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) responsibility for promulgating the
Type A and Type B natural resource damage assessment regulations. (The Ex-
ecutive Order also directed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
promulgate procedures to guide trustees in bringing natural resource damage
claims against the Superfund. As noted earlier, SARA disallowed the use of Su-
perfund monies for natural resource damage claims.) However, the December 11,
1982 deadline imposed by the Act for promulgation of the assessment regulations
passed without their publication. In order to force the rulemaking process, the
state of Montana filed suit against DOI and EPA for failure to perform their
respective duties. This suit was subsequently voluntarily withdrawn, but was
followed by two new suits, one brought by the state of New Jersey and the other
by the New Mexico Department of Health and the Environment.
The New Jersey suit was heard in the District Court of New Jersey.^' As a
result of a finding in favor of the plaintiffs, DOI entered into a consent order
whereby the agency agreed to a specific timetable for promulgation of the reg-
ulations. Under the consent order, DOI agreed to promulgate proposed rulemak-
ings for Type B regulations by December 20, 1985 and proposed Type A regu-
lations by April 5, 1986. The consent order further specified that final Type B
and A regulations would be promulgated by April 22, 1986 and August 7, 1986,
respectively. These deadlines were subsequently extended slightly by the court.
A notice of proposed rulemaking for Type B regulations was published in the
Eederal Register on the court imposed deadline, and final Type B regulations were
published on August 1, 1986.^^ Proposed Type A regulations were published on
May 6, 1986; final Type A regulations were published on March 20, 1987.^' SARA
requires the President to promulgate amended regulations for assessing natural
resource damages that incorporate the new damage assessment provisions added
by the Act. Proposed amendments to the assessment regulations were published
by DOI in the Eederal Register on April 17, 1987.^"
The Type A regulations deal exclusively with minor discharges of oil or re-
leases of hazardous substances in coastal or marine environments. Specifically,
they apply only to wildlife mortality and closure of recreational areas resulting
from discharges or releases that occur in, or enter into, coastal or marine envi-
ronments near the water surface or intertidal area, and that are of short duration.
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matically estimating damages to certain resources based on the type of discharge
or release of specific contaminants and the specific receiving coastal or marine
environment. The types of resource injuries considered by the model include:
short-term lethal effects on lower trophic biota; direct and indirect lethal effects
on fur seals, certain waterfowl and other shorebirds, seabirds, fish and shellfish;
and the closure of fishing and hunting areas and public beaches.
The model is composed of interactive physical fates, biological effects, and
economic damages submodels containing chemical, biological, and economic data
bases, respectively. The physical fates submodel determines average concentra-
tion, transportation, and dispersion of oil or hazardous substances through the
coastal or marine environment. Given input on the fate of the contaminants from
the physical fates submodel, the biological effects submodel calculates the average
loss in biomass by species category. Data on baseline biological resource con-
ditions and beach uses are contained in the biological and economic submodel
data bases, respectively. The commercial and recreational uses of biological re-
sources are determined by historical patterns for each of these classes of uses.
Public beach visitation rates are also based on historical patterns. In the case of
fisheries damage, fish resources are allocated in the model between recreational
and commercial harvests foregone. Quantification of resource services lost serve
as data input into the economic damages submodel.
Dollar damages are calculated in the economic submodel using market and
nonmarket prices for commercial use of fur seals, commercial and recreational
fishing, hunting and birdwatching, and public beach use. Lost in-situ value for
commercial fisheries is calculated as the change in the total value of landings
(estimated using province-specific, ex-vessel prices) minus harvest costs. Eor all
other resource injuries, nonmarket values based on willingness-to-pay (WTP) es-
timates derived in existing studies are used to calculate damages. Eor example,
the lost value of recreational fisheries is based on province-specific marginal WTP
estimates for sportfishing. The value of lost waterfowl and other birds are cal-
culated using marginal WTP estimates for their consumptive and nonconsumptive
uses. Beach days lost are valued using average WTP estimates obtained from
existing studies of the value of recreational beach use. The regulations stipulate
that these market and nonmarket values are applicable only if the discharge or
release is not expected to significantly change recreational or commercial prices
for these resource uses.
Due to the limitations of the Type A model, the regulations instruct the trustee
to use the Type B procedures whenever the trustee has reason to believe that the
types of potential resource injuries are significantly different than the types con-
sidered by the Type A model, or if any other model assumptions or conditions
are violated. Eor example, in cases where potential injuries to wildlife species
•included in the model data bases only include sub-lethal, chronic effects, or if
injury occurs to wildlife species not included in the model data bases, then the
Type B procedures are to be used. The regulations also allow for parallel Type
A and Type B assessments in cases where use of the Type A procedures may
capture only part of overall resource damages resulting from a minor discharge
or release into a coastal or marine environment. Thus, in cases involving multiple
resource injuries resulting from the same discharge, a trustee could, for example,
use the Type A procedures to assess damages for fish mortality, and use the Type
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in the Type A model data base. However, the rules do not allow for use of parallel
assessments to determine damages for different types of impacts on service flows
associated with the same resource. It should also be noted that the rules give the
potentially responsible polluting party the right to request a Type B assessment
even when the Type A procedures might be applicable, provided they can show
that use of the Type A procedures may not be fully appropriate, and if they are
willing to advance the assessment costs to the trustee.
The remainder of this paper focuses only on the Type B damage assessment
procedures. We chose this focus because the major principles underlying both
the Type A and Type B rules are set out by the latter rulemaking, and treatment
of the more controversial elements of damage assessments, such as the inclusion
of non-use values, are addressed by the Type B rules. Moreover, the Type A
rules make use of market prices and unit values pulled from existing studies, while
the Type B rules procedures set out speciflc methodologies for the use in esti-
mating resource damage in individual cases. The Type B procedures are thus
likely to produce more accurate estimates of economic welfare losses in individual
cases than the Type A procedures.
2. Overview of the Type B Regulations. The Type B regulations set out the basic
processes to be followed by Federal and state trustees for: 1) determining and
documenting natural resource injury caused by releases of oil or hazardous sub-
stances; 2) quantifying the effects of this injury on the human uses of the services
provided by these resources; and 3) determining natural resource damages. The
regulations explain the procedural steps for trustees to follow and provide criteria
for selecting methodologies to determine resource injury and damages. They do
not, however, provide specific guidance for implementing the various method-
ologies. Additional information on the methodologies is provided by a set of ac-
companying Technical Information Documents.
Because trustees are authorized to recover the costs of performing the as-
sessment from the responsible parties, the regulations mandate that the assess-
ment process be performed at "reasonable cost." Costs are defined as reasonable
when " 1) the injury, quantification, and damage determination phases have a well-
defined relationship to one another and are coordinated; 2) the anticipated incre-
ment of extra benefits, in terms of the precision or accuracy of estimates, obtained
by using a more costly methodology for injury, quantification or damage deter-
mination outweigh the anticipated increment of extra costs of the more expensive
procedure; and 3) the anticipated costs of performing the assessment are expected
to be less than the anticipated damage amount."^^
The focus of this paper is on the provisions of the regulations that contain key
economic decision points or that provide guidance for the use of economic meth-
odologies to assess damages. These provisions include Subpart B—Pre-assess-
ment Phase, Subpart C—Assessment Plan, and Subpart E—Type B Assessments.
a. Subpart B—Pre-assessment Flan—Subpart B of the rules sets out the pro-
cedural steps for initiating the damage assessment process and for preliminary
analysis of potentially injured natural resources. Section 11.23 outlines the preas-
sessment screen, which provides the criteria for determining whether the iden-
tified discharge or release justifies a natural resource damage assessment. The
pre-assessment screen includes the first key economic decision point in the
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The pre-assessment screen is designed to be a relatively quick "desk top"
review of the existing data to determine whether the discharge or release warrants
a natural resource damage assessment. Here the trustee is charged with quali-
tatively identifying the resources at risk and deriving preliminary assessment cost
estimates based on a review of existing data using minimal fieldwork and previous
trustee experience with similar accidents involving such resources. The screen
requires that a decision to proceed with an assessment should be based on the
following determinations by the trustee: I) that the discharge or release is covered
under the relevant sections of CERCLA or the Clean Water Act; 2) that the
discharge or release has likely injured natural resources under the jurisdiction of
the trustee; 3) that the quantity and concentrations of the contaminants released
are sufficient to potentially cause resource injury; 4) that the data required to
pursue an assessment are readily available or likely to be obtained at reasonable
cost; and 5) that any planned or completed response action will not completely
remedy the injury to the natural resources. The pre-assessment screen thus re-
quires a preliminary determination by the trustee, based on existing data and
minimal fieldwork, of the nature and extent of possible resource injury, and the
human uses of the resources potentially affected. The rules discourage the early
sampling of potentially injured natural resources at this stage unless it is absolutely
necessary. The information gathered in the pre-assessment screen is to be used
by the trustee to determine whether an assessment could be performed at rea-
sonable cost and the likelihood that a damage action would be successful.
b. Suhpart C—Assessment Plan—After an affirmative decision is made to
proceed in the pre-assessment screen, but before initiating a damage assessment,
the trustee must develop a detailed assessment plan in accordance with the pro-
cedures set forth by Subpart C of the regulations. Section 11.31 requires that the
assessment plan identify and document all of the scientific and economic pro-
cedures and methodologies that are expected to be used in assessing the resource
injury and determining damages. Documentation is required in sufficient detail
to be able to make a determination of whether the proposed assessment approach
is cost-effective. The regulations interpret the term "cost-effective" to mean "that
when two or more activities provide the same level of benefits, the least cost
activity providing that level of benefits will be selected."'^
The Economic Methodology Determination section of the proposed rules (Sec-
tion 11.35) allows the trustee to use restoration or replacement costs, or diminution
in use values as the basis for measuring natural resource damages, and provides
guidance to the trustee for making the choice. This section specifies that "the
authorized official shall select the lesser of I) restoration or replacement costs or
2) diminution of use values as the measure of damages."-^ It further specifies that
rough approximations of the costs and benefits of these alternative measures of
damages should be calculated. The costs and benefits in this calculation are de-
fined, respectively, as "the expected present value, if possible, of anticipated
restoration or replacement costs, expressed in constant dollars, and separated
into capital, operating, and maintenance costs, including the timing of the costs;"
and "the expected present value, if possible, of anticipated use values gained
through restoration or replacement, expressed in constant dollars, specified for
the same base year as the cost estimate, and separated into recurring and non-
recurring benefits, including the timing of the benefit."•^*'
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should rely upon existing data and studies, and that no new data collection or
modelling is needed to complete the determination. They also stipulate that if the
existing data is insufficient to perform the economic methodology determination,
it may be postponed until the completion of the formal injury determination phase
in Subpart E.^'
c. Subpart E—Type B Assessments—Subpart E of the regulations deals with
the actual implementation of Type B assessments, and lays out the steps to be
followed by trustees for choosing among and implementing alternative method-
ologies for each of the three major phases in the damages assessment process—
injury determination, service reduction quantification, and damages estimation.
The following discussion deals only with those parts of the Subpart dealing with
the estimation of monetary damages.
Guidance to trustees for estimating damages based upon restoration or re-
placement costs and certain restrictions on what these measures may include is
discussed in Section 11.81. When restoration or replacement costs are to be used,
they must be based on the least-cost alternative restoration or replacement scheme
that returns the resource services to their pre-injury, baseline condition. Further,
the restoration or replacement alternative used to calculate damages must be
technically feasible to undertake. The measure of damages calculated using res-
toration or replacement costs may also include any diminution in resource use
value over the recovery period.-"*
Criteria for the selection and implementation of use value methodologies is
provided by Sections 11.83 and 11.84 of Subpart E. Key interpretations and defi-
nitions are also found here. The term "use value" is defined as "the value to the
public of recreational or other public uses of the resource, as measured by changes
in consumer surplus, any fees or other payments collectable by the government
for a private party's use of the natural resource, and any economic rent accruing
to a private party because the government does not charge a fee or price for use
of the resource." The regulations also provide that, "In instances where the
Federal or State agency acting as trustee is the majority operator or controller of
a for- or not-for-profit enterprise, and the injury to the natural resource results
in a loss to such an enterprise, that portion of the lost income from this enterprise
. . . may be included as a measure of damages."-^' Damages, however, can only
be measured by the diminution in value of baseline "committed uses" of natural
resource services over the period it takes for the injured resource to recover
naturally. In addition, these baseline "committed uses" must be reasonable prob-
able; purely speculative uses of the injured resource are precluded from consid-
eration.-*- A committed use of natural resource services is defined as "a current
public use, or a planned public use of a natural resource for which there is a
documented legal, administrative, budgetary, or a financial committment before
the discharge of oil or release of a hazardous substance is detected."^-^
The specific methodologies that may be used by trustees to estimate damages
for both market and nonmarket natural resource services, and the conditions under
which they may be used to estimate certain resource damages are identified in
Section 11.83. Guidance for selection of economic methodologies in this part
prescribes a hierarchy among valuation methods, with one group of methodologies
for resources (or resources similar to those injured) that are traded in markets,
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methodologies that includes more specific information on their use is provided
by an accompanying Technical Information Document.^"
In the case of a resource for which a well-defined market exists, the regulations
stipulate that the trustee must make a determination as to whether the specific
market is reasonably competitive before choosing a valuation methodology. If the
market for such a resource is determined to be reasonably competitive, the trustee
is instructed to first turn to the market price methodology for determining dam-
ages, which is based on the diminution in market price for the injured resource.
If the trustee determines that the market price methodology is not appropriate
for valuing a particular resource, the regulations provide that the "appraisal"
methodology be employed to value the resource if sufficient information exists.
This methodology simply uses the difference between the before-injury and after-
injury appraisal values for the resource in question. Trustees are instructed to
turn to the "Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions" for
guidance in making such resource value appraisals."
If the trustee determines that neither the market price nor the appraisal meth-
odologies are appropriate, the regulations provide for the use of nonmarket val-
uation methodologies for measuring the use value of natural resource services.
For nonmarket resources, the regulations allow the trustee discretion in the use
of methodologies that estimate use value measures of damages based on estimates
of willingness-to-pay (WTP).-^* For injured resources which are used as inputs
into the production of products associated with well-defined market prices, the
regulations specify that the Factor Income methodology may be employed to
estimate the economic rent attributable to the resource as a measure of damages.
Alternatively, for natural resources which provide consumer utility, the regula-
tions specify the Travel Cost, Hedonic Pricing, and the Contingent Valuation (CV)
methods as acceptable approaches for measuring damages. Regional unit values
derived from existing studies may also be used if these values are based on WTP
and closely resemble the specific recreational or other experience to which they
are applied to estimate damages." The regulations also allow, in addition to the
specific methodologies listed, the use of any other valuation methodology that
cost-effectively measures use values based on willingness-to-pay.^'^
While the regulations allow trustees complete discretion in the choice of val-
uation approaches for measuring nonmarket resource damages based on reduc-
tions in use value, certain restrictions are placed on the use of CV to measure
damages based upon option and existence values. Section 11.83 (d)(5) explains
that CV "can determine use values and explicitly determine option and existence
value," but provides that "the use of the CV methodology to explicitly estimate
option and existence values should be used only if the authorized official deter-
mines that no other use values can be determined." While DOI acknowledged
that option and existence values would ordinarily be additive to use value, they
noted that Section 301(c) of CFRCLA mentions only use values, and not non-
use (intrinsic) values.
Guidance is also provided on various smaller issues related to the implemen-
tation of the valuation methodologies. These issues include the handling of pos-
sible double counting problems, the treatment of uncertainty in damage deter-
mination, and discounting costs and benefits over time. The regulations specify
that double counting of resource benefits should be avoided, but offer little guid-
ance except to say that resource damages should be based on the residual resource166 Roger C. Dower and Paul F. Scodari
injury after incorporating the effects (or anticipated effects) of response actions
on resource services.'^ With regard to the treatment of uncertainties in damage
determination, the regulations state that when considerable uncertainties exist
concerning the assumptions made when implementing valuation methodologies,
trustees should consider alternative assumptions and document their effects on
the calculation of costs and benefits."" (The regulations are broad enough to allow
the inclusion of probability estimates of the likelihood of occurrence for all pa-
rameter estimates to account for uncertainty.) Eor discounting costs and benefits
over time (including past and future), the regulations mandate the use of a 10%
real rate of discount as specified by the Office of Management and Budget."'
Preliminary Evaluation
In the ideal, the natural resource damage assessment process under CERCLA
should establish a framework to accomplish two basic and important purposes.
In an aggregate sense, the regulations should compensate the public for injuries
to their natural resources from oil or hazardous waste spills and releases. Spe-
cifically, the scheme should make the public whole, so that the public is as well-
off after natural resource injury as they were before the injury. The law should
also seek to redistribute a specific subset of the costs of certain types of industrial
or commercial activities: those non-health related extemal economic costs that
fall on the public as a result of "improper" disposal or handling of oil and haz-
ardous wastes."^ In this sense, compensation, in combination with the other pro-
visions of CERCLA (as well as private rights of action under state common law)
would act to internalize the social costs associated with past and future waste
disposal practices. CERCLA assumes that the disposer is always in the position
of being able to reduce risks most cheaply and thus bears the full responsibility
of insuring against, and compensating for, public natural resource injury. In order
for the CERCLA natural resource assessment provisions to achieve an efficient
allocation of social resources, the system has to generate reasonably accurate
estimates of the true economic value of injured natural resources and to do so
while incurring the least costs possible.
Given the nascent nature of state or federal attempts to utilize the damage
assessment scheme, it is difficult to forecast how closely the damage assessment
framework outlined in the first section of this paper will hit this mark. Many
elements of the assessment process will be modified and more fully defined by
the court system as cases are heard and evaluated. However, there are several
controversial elements, definitions, and assumptions built into the damage as-
sessment regulations that, assuming they are upheld by the courts, appear to have
the potential to undermine the equity and efficiency of damage assessments. As
currently written, the regulations appear to suggest that many natural resource
injuries may go undervalued. These issues, as will be discussed below, are quite
varied, but share one common characteristic. They all reflect, in part, the difficulty
of integrating economic concepts of natural resource value (and their estimation)
into the legal environment.
Natural Resource Use Values
The Type B rules define the "use value" of a natural resource in terms of the
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in use value to serve as the basis for estimating damages. Thus, natural resource
damages may be reflected by reductions in consumer surplus and economic rents
accruing to resource users. Although the regulations adopt a rather formal eco-
nomic concept of resource value, they retain a "common law" bias towards the
use of market prices to reflect use values. The rules specify that in situations
where injured resources are traded in competitive markets, diminution in market
price should serve as the reduction in use value for purposes of damage estimation.
Only in cases where injured resources are not associated with observable market
prices do the regulations allow for the application of the more economic-based
approaches for estimating changes in use values.
Because market prices do not directly indicate the net benefits provided by
goods, they do not provide adequate measures of welfare changes. While DOI
explicitly recognized that diminution in market price may not fully reflect the
change in social welfare associated with injury to market resources, they argued
that market prices are widely recognized by the courts as a reasonable basis for
estimating damages and represent the most cost-effective approach. While the
use of diminution in market price for measuring damages may in some instances
be reasonable, in many cases reliance on market prices may seriously undervalue
resource injury. For example, market resources such as wetlands often provide
bundles of nonmarket goods and services to society, the value of which are not
fully reflected in the market price of the land.
Natural Resource Intrinsic Values
The regulatory definition of economic use value discussed above appears to in-
clude both direct consumptive (e.g. hunting) and non-consumptive (e.g. bird-
watching) values of natural resources, but treats intrinsic values such as option
and existence values somewhat differently. The rules do acknowledge and ex-
plicitly discuss intrinsic values; however, they stipulate that these values can be
estimated and used as the basis for a damage claim only if the trustee is unable
to estimate direct use values. The regulations also limit economic damages only
to those damages that can be associated with "committed" not "speculative"
uses ofthe resource, perhaps ruling out the consideration of option and existence
values in all but a few situations. The proposed rules originally included a clas-
sification of resources, called "special resources," which may have mitigated the
anti-intrinsic value bias ofthe final rules. Special resources were defined by the
proposed regulations as "those natural resources committed to a specific use by
law before the discharge of oil or release of hazardous substance . . . [including]
resources set aside primarily to preserve wildlife habitat or other unique or sen-
sitive environments."''' Compensation for "special resources" would have been
based on replacement or restoration costs rather than lost use value.'"' This would
have allowed the trustee to treat resources with low use value but high intrinsic
value as special cases. The exemption for such resources articulated in the pro-
posed rule, however, was dropped in the final rule.
The debate among various interested parties concerning intrinsic values is the
result of differences in perspective and philosophy. Some of these are more easily
identified and discussed than others.
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here is somewhat a matter of philosophy; an environmentalist might say yes, an
industrial polluter might say no. Yet the evidence would seem to support a positive
response. It is difficult to explain the high level of social resources that are devoted
to protecting wilderness areas and endangered species, the creation of national
parks and marine sanctuaries, and the whole of our nation's environmental pro-
tection efforts, if option and existence values were not some part of the value we
accord those programs. Eurther, the growing body of economic literature on the
subject of intrinsic values, while not strictly in accord, does provide considerable
weight at least on a conceptual level, as well as some empirical evidence for these
values."*'
Second is the question as to whether intrinsic values fall within the traditional
legal concepts of economic value as defined under common law theories of dam-
age. The case law involving natural resource damage cases is not very helpful
here. We know of no single case where option and existence values formed an
explicit basis for a damage claim. While some states have included values rep-
resenting these concepts in estimating natural resource damage assessments, we
are not aware of any that have been the subject of court scrutiny; most are settled
out of court and thus do not provide much in the way of precedent."^ However,
a legal parallel may exist in personal injury cases. Courts have long held that in
such cases compensation may be made for both direct economic losses (such as
lost income, medical expenses, etc.) as well as "non-pecuniary" damages in-
cluding pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and mental anguish over the loss
of a loved one."*'
Although not a perfect fit, intrinsic values have many of the same character-
istics as the non-precuniary damages in personal injury cases. Most notably, they
both represent kinds of effects that we perceive to be real but have a very hard
time putting into dollar terms. There is an important difference between specu-
lative damages (those that require a stretch of one's imagination to believe) and
damages that are uncertain as to their value. While courts may be comfortable
with the notion of pain and suffering as a very real and believable effect of personal
injury, they continue to grapple with how best to express those values in dollar
terms. This uncertainty may not be the basis for excluding the consideration of
"non-use" values, but may lead to widely varying outcomes for very similar cases.
Einally, the uncertainty as to how best to handle intrinsic values leads to a
third element of the controversy over their inclusion in natural resource damage
assessments. While it may be theoretically possible to measure option and ex-
istence values through other economic methods, the technique with the most
promise and that has been applied most often is Contingent Valuation. The ques-
tion of whether one can accurately measure individuals' valuation of any com-
modity through preference revealing surveys continues to divide the economics
community and is often dismissed out-of-hand by non-economists. Some might
argue that if the rebuttable presumption provides substantial leverage to damage
assessments, then it may be unwise to allow for the use a valuation technique
whose efficacy for estimating intrinsic values is still a matter of debate within the
economics profession. (It should be noted that a trustee could estimate intrinsic
values and add these to estimated use values to calculate resource damages, but
the resulting assessment would not be afforded the rebuttable presumption of
accuracy in legal proceedings.)
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debate except to note that there appears to be developing a consensus on the
conditions that need to be met in order for a CV study to be credible, and an
improved understanding of the limits and biases of the technique in its general
application."* Courts have extensive experience with judging the credibility of
alternative approaches to measuring economic damages, and a rather strong ar-
gument can be made that the option should be available to public trustees under
the assessment rules subject to review and consideration of the judicial system.
There are undoubtedly other factors that carry weight in the intrinsic value
debate. Once one is willing to admit that such values do exist under certain cir-
cumstances and that they are permissible under the law, the entire issue would
appear to collapse into a series of questions concerning reasonableness and cer-
tainty that courts have to deal with all the time to some degree. This would argue
for more explicit recognition of the potential for such values in the regulations
and the flexibility for the trustee to attempt to estimate such damages if they feel
a credible case can be made.
Real Versus Perceived Injury
The CERCLA natural resource damage provisions imply that natural resource
trustees should be compensated for lost or altered human uses of public natural
resources services resulting from injuries to these resources caused by releases
of oil or hazardous substances. The regulations mirror this causal chain and set
out a process in which an injury to a public natural resource resulting from a
release of oil or hazardous substance is quantified, the effect of this resource
injury on public uses of resource services is determined, and an economic value
is attached to changes in public uses of resource services. The rules thus require
that a resource injury be "measurable" in order for it to be part of a damage
assessment. While trustees are required to demonstrate the relationship between
pollutants and the resource injury, at the same time, the rules provide for the
application of economic valuation tools in the damage assessment phase that do
not necessarily require estimation of measurable injury. Economists value dam-
ages on the basis of changes in consumer and producer behavior by isolating
individuals' responses to their perceptions of new conditions and resource char-
acteristics. For an economist, perceived damages are real damages if they result
in changes to consumer utility or producer production capabilities, regardless of
measurable physical injury to the natural resources in question.
It is not clear whether the authors of the regulations were aware of this potential
for confiict. Yet, given the bias of the rules towards the demonstration of physical
harm before the award of damages, the potential is very real. This is particularly
so given the chronic, sub-acute nature of many of the environmental injuries that
are likely to occur from hazardous waste releases. A wetland area containing
above background levels of a particular pollutant (but below a state or federal
standard) has experienced an economic injury if certain birdwatchers make fewer
trips to the wetland. This is so even if there is no physical injury or risk of injury
to the biological system. The rules appear to accept this proposition but at the
same time require a substantial demonstration of physical harm. Given what ap-
pear to be rather high burdens of proof concerning physical and biological harm
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compensation only in those cases where clear evidence of measurable injury is
available.
Public Versus Private Damages
The regulations provide for the assessment of damages to publicly owned re-
sources, but explicitly exclude compensation for injury to privately owned re-
sources. The justification for this bifurcation of damage categories is the definition
of resources covered by the Act which is interpreted by DOI to exclude damages
that might be recoverable under private rights of action for injury to privately
owned resources. This distinction between private and public resources has al-
ready generated tremendous confusion and controversy. Several key points may
help focus this debate if not provide ready resolutions. To help frame the following
discussion, we refer to "private damages" as those private losses which result
from injury to privately owned resources and define "public damages" as the
aggregation of producer and consumer losses resulting from injury to publicly
owned resources.
First, the distinction between public and private damages may seem somewhat
arbitrary to an economist. If a hazardous waste release has altered the charac-
teristic of a natural resource that serves as an input to the production of a rec-
reational experience (utility function) or commercial product (production func-
tion), the economic damages are given by the willingness-to-pay (or sell) of
recreationists or producers and consumers to avoid (accept) the additional cost
of adjusting to the altered input. Whether the natural resource is privately or
publicly owned is inconsequential at least on this level of analysis. However,
accepting this distinction between public and private resources defined by the
Act, economists would take the view that damages resulting from injury to publicly
owned resources are represented by the aggregation of losses to all parties who
use the resource.
In a strict legal setting, however, using the lost economic rents accruing to
commercial harvestors of an injured animal species, for example, to place an
economic value on that species, may suggest that private damages which are not
permissable under the Act are at stake, regardless of the possible public trustee-
ship of the injured animals. The regulations adopt, at least on the surface, the
economic view of public natural resource damages which holds that aggregate
private losses to individuals who use public resources in production or con-
sumption represent the lost value of these resources. However, there appears to
be an increasing tendency to interpret the rules to limit the use of private income
losses to individuals who use public resources in commercial production to ap-
proximate diminished public use values. That is, while there appears to be a
consensus that losses in consumer value to users of a public resource (e.g. users
of a public beach) represent compensable public loss, considerable confusion
exists as to whether reductions in income experienced by users of public resources
for commercial enterprises (e.g. commercial fishing) are compensable. To the
extent that the courts do not accept the economist's approach to estimating value
based on both consumer surplus and economic rent, it is possible that resource
value represented by economic rents may go uncompensated under the rules.'''Compensation for Natural Resource Injury 17]
Second is the issue of who is in the least-cost position for bringing successful
natural resource damage claims. If the Act or the rules limit the use by a public
trustee of private losses as an approximation of public damage, private parties
would be forced to bring individual suits under state common law to seek com-
pensation. Given the subtlety of many ofthe injuries from hazardous waste spills
and the expense and complexity of proper economic damage assessments, the
conditions under which a private party could mount a successful case may be
limited. A further complication results from damages to natural resources that do
not obey property lines or political boundaries. It is not clear how injuries to
private parties from contaminated air would be handled under a strict interpre-
tation of private versus public resources. The risk of too narrowly defining public
versus private damages is excessively large litigation and other transaction costs
(such as duplicative assessments) to achieve fair compensation. A more cost-
effective solution might allow for consolidation of public and private damage
claims when the trustee can take advantage of cost economies-of-scale. Of course,
allowing for consolidation of public and private claims would raise a host of theo-
retical and practical questions and problems. For example, would state or federal
trustees be in the position to determine the validity of private claims? If so, could
trustees collect and distribute damage awards to private claimants? How would
this be accomplished?
Finally, the last point raises the issue of who gets the award. As the rules
currently read, a public trustee claiming damages based on losses to public users
has to use the award to restore, rehabilitate, or acquire comparable natural re-
sources. Individual users would not receive compensation for losses incurred after
the release, but before the restoration, even though such losses would be included
in the assessment. From an economic point of view, the resource allocation im-
plications of such a distributional outcome are minimal. The legal questions are
more interesting. For example, would public users have standing to bring suit
under state tort law against the state or the responsible party for damages incurred
but for which they receive no compensation? The answer is unclear, but there
may be some potential for double payments for the same injury to the extent that
the public user is viewed by the courts as having a cause-of-action independent
of the trustee's claim over the injured resource.
The debate over public versus private resources is not only a question of
ownership. It involves distinctions between ownership, private versus public in-
juries, and income versus value losses. The net effect is uncertain pending res-
olution by the courts.
The final assessment ofthe public versus private resource issue is an empirical
one and has to await some practical experience with the process. It may be that
the assessment process conducted by a public trustee will provide potential private
parties with all the information and analysis they will need to bring compensation
actions under state common law. On the other hand, the incentives for any one
injured party to undertake the necessary studies to support a tort action on their
behalf are sufficiently small to assume that few private actions will be brought in
the absence of an organized group of plaintiffs or readily identifiable and easily
valued damages (such as fish kills). It is worth asking the question whether soci-
ety's best interests are served by encouraging a large number of relatively small,
but still expensive, legal actions.172 Roger C. Dower and Paul F. Scodari
Conclusion
The emerging compensation framework for natural resource damages attempts
to integrate the economics and law of natural resource valuation into a single
comprehensive package. The ability of the framework to achieve the dual goals
of fair compensation and the efficient allocation of social resources is a function
of how carefully the perspectives and limits of economic valuation are coordinated
with the constraints imposed by the legal structure in which these assessments
will be judged. We have singled out four current issues concerning the application
of natural resource economics to the CERCLA assessment process that appear
to have the potential to skew the compensation formula towards under-compen-
sation. Others may well be equally important. For example, the reliance in the
regulations on a ten percent discount rate is a double-edged sword, perhaps greatly
under-valuing future losses but over-valuing past damages.
We do not have a crystal ball that offers a clear picture of how the assessment
process will actually be implemented in practice. Many of the issues raised here
as well as many technical elements of the DOI regulations await final resolution
in the courts. Nevertheless, we have tried to provide some hints as to likely
outcomes. The magnitude of the possible effects cannot be predicted, but a qual-
itative assessment can be constructed.
Our sense is that the tendency will be toward awards that represent something
less than the full economic value of natural resource injuries. We believe the
assessment regulations as they stand foster this outcome. However, whether or
not the regulations contain an inherent bias towards undercompensation is de-
batable. Moreover, if one accepts our preliminary conclusion, the question then
arises as to whether the perceived bias in the regulations results from an inherent
bias towards undercompensation in CERCLA itself or results primarily from a
conservative interpretation of the CERCLA natural resource damage provisions
by DOI. The latter appears to be the prevailing view among the environmental
organizations and state trustees who are currently suing DOI over the Type B
rules. This view also appears to be shared by others, including members of Con-
gress. Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.), speaking in support of passage of SARA
on the Senate floor, stated that "the rules to date strongly discourage natural
resource damage claims from ever being brought and would severely reduce re-
coverable damages in those few cases in which they were sought."^"
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